








































This paper studies the way the adjustment process takes place in labor demand when it is 
expressed as a Cox proportional hazard model. I use a simulated firm-level panel data 
based on a threshold model with periods of high and low frequency of employment 
fluctuations, which is consistent with the infrequent way the adjustment process takes 
place according to the new theories of adjustment. I model the probability that a firm 
adjusts its employment level during a time-period as a Cox proportional hazard function 
dependent on the deviation of its actual employment value variable from its target. I show 
that the aggregate employment change, based on a high proportion of firms experiencing 
large employment fluctuations, could be very well represented by the Cox proportional 
hazard and also could be very well approximated by the empirical mean of the product of 
the hazard function and the deviations. On the other hand, I show that the aggregate 
employment change based on a very low proportion of firms facing large employment 
adjustment can be well represented by a quadratic (nonlinear) adjustment hazard.   
Finally, I  try to conclude that in order to construct a measure of deviation from the target 
level (which is the state variable of the model) the regression of the employment 
fluctuation on the wage fluctuation could be more helpful than the regression of the 
employment fluctuation on the hours fluctuation.  
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  2I. Introduction 
 
 
The literature of labor markets recognizes the sluggish behavior of adjustment 
process, and the traditional justification is that the employment fluctuation is 
accompanied by adjustment costs.
2 This reason obliges firms not to choose the optimal 
employment level, but instead, to hire or fire as much as the previous optimal and real 
level of employment in addition to the present ones could stand for. This results in a 
nonlinear pattern of employment fluctuation in contrast with the earlier model of linear 
adjustment based on standard quadratic adjustment costs. Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) 
have prepared an essay about the adjustment cost in factor demand  introducing all the 
forms the adjustment costs would theoretically take and drawing the conclusion that 
employment adjustment at firm level is slow and not characterized by symmetric 
quadratic costs. This could provide a good reason to give up using the quadratic 
adjustment cost for studying the behavior of employment fluctuation. But on the other 
side, this renouncement could make difficult the aggregation process across firms in 
opposition to the smooth quadratic adjustment cost could be able to do.  
    
Caballero and Engel (1993) show through an adjustment hazard model that the 
average employment fluctuation is an increasing and nonlinear function of the so-called 
deviation of the desired level of employment from its previous real value. This nonlinear 
dependence stems from the cross-sectional distribution of the deviations in time, which in 
turn is settled by the aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks and the proportion of firms that 
adjust. They depict the aggregate adjustment process involving the heterogeneity of 
                                                 
2 Costs of adjusting labor demand are those related to the flows of workers, i.e., to changing the 
identity of the individuals filling a fixed number of jobs. They include among others: Search costs 
(advertising, screening and processing new employees), the cost of training (including disruptions 
to production as previously trained workers’ time is devoted to on-the-job instruction of new 
workers); and the overhead cost of maintaining that part of the personnel function dealing with 
recruitment and worker outflows. All of these can be substantial even if ∆x=0, as new workers 
must be hired and trained to replace those who depart (whose possibly involuntary departure 
also0 generates costs). Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996.    
 
  3agents (firms) and idiosyncratic uncertainty and their approach seems attractive because 
it doesn’t need the assumption of the representative agent to allow for description of the 
aggregate employment dynamics.   
 
In this paper I intend to: a) build a stochastic model for the adjustment process of 
employment in firm level, b) the factor demands (present at firm’s production function) 
evolution may be affected by productivity, demand and other shocks and this justifies the 
stochastic element of this model and c) will use simulated data in order to assess different 
estimation approaches. 
 
Following recent empirical contributions
3 (Caballero and Engel 1993, Caballero et 
al 1995), my study consists on the following components. First, I simulate some data 
based on the pattern of no and full employment adjustment range at firm level. Second, 
following Caballero and Engel I analyze how firms respond to the deviations in the 
employment level. Third I analyze the relationship between the frequency of firms 
undergoing periods of lumpy adjustment and aggregate employment fluctuations in order 
to see if the bunching of employment micro changes is important for understanding 
macro outcomes. My simulated data allow me to confront new theories with data 
simulated according to a threshold behavior as the threshold effect should be particularly 
pronounced for an economy compound of small and medium size firms (as Italian labor 
market is) in a highly uncertain environment. 
     
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the analytical framework. 
Section 3 presents the aggregate form of the model under an empirical mean 
representation and also econometric tools to check the properties of infrequent 
adjustment process. In Section 4 I try to construct and measure the employment shortage 
by relating the changes in plants deviations between the actual and desired employment 
to the fluctuations in wages per worker that I recover from the aggregate and 
idiosyncratic  shocks behavior.  
                                                 
3 See the literature on aggregate dynamics in the presence of fixed costs on microeconomic adjustment (S,s) 
models, Blinder (1981), Caplin (1985), Caplin and Spulber (1987), Caballero and Engel (1991, 
1992,1993,1997), the literature related to the importance of lumpy changes in plant level employment 
Hamermesh (1989), Davis and Haltiwanger (1990,1992) , Bresnahan and Ramey (1991). 
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II. Analytical Framework 
 
 
When shocks of different type (productivity, demand, wage shocks, etc ) affect 
the labor market, firms might react to them. The first reaction is the creation of a 
desirable value of the major variables of the firms activity. The second reaction is the 
adoption of the current level to this desirable level. This process is called adjustment and 
seems difficult to be measured as long as it is difficult to measure precisely the desirable 
level. Probably because of the adjustment costs firms find costly to adjust employment.  
 
Several studies have attempted to understand the structure of this adjustment. 
Most of the empirical studies before 1990s have assumed that the adjustment cost 
function is quadratic in the employment change rate, with marginal cost linearly 
increasing. Therefore firms adjust smoothly over a long time period by small units of 
adjustment in any period. During 1990s, another branch of literature was blooming under 
the assumption of fixed costs and piece-wise linear adjustment costs rather than quadratic 
ones. Under these costs, firms wait and adjust infrequently in order not to pay 
continuously the adjustment costs. This implies an inaction range where the firms 
renounce of adjusting their employment level until the deviation of the current 
employment level from the desired one reaches a threshold. Under no adjustment costs 
the employment fluctuates a lot over time reacting to the economic shocks. Under 
quadratic adjustment costs the employment will continuously adjust less than under  no-
adjustment costs. Under piece-wise linear costs, over some periods the employment will 
not adjust at all even if some shock is present. Uncertainty regarding the future (fear of an 
adverse future shock) makes the adjustment employment process reluctant . Under fixed 
adjustment costs only large shocks would convince firms to adjust and these costs 
become sunk at the moment of adjustment.      
 
Another way to study the adjustment process is by expressing the probability of 
adjustment as a function of the deviation of the current value of employment from the 
  5optimal one. Caballero and Engel (1993, 1996) show that in an (S,s)
4 framework with 
random fixed costs, average employment fluctuation is an increasing and nonlinear 
function of the so-called deviations between desired and actual employment level   
implying that large deviations lead to larger changes in employment than the small ones. 
This relationship becomes linear
5 under quadratic costs as firms fill a constant part of the 
deviation between desired and actual employment level and linear with a size of inactions 
between for piece-wise
6 linear cost. Therefore on the axes of deviations, the constant 
hazard adjustment is equivalent to the quadratic adjustment costs and brings about 
smooth adjustment while the piecewise linear and quadratic hazard adjustment brings 
about infrequencies.  
 
The economic intuition supporting the adjustment hazard theory is that when a 
random shock increases the deviation of the desired level from the current one some 
firms adjust the employment in a lumpy way. The others will not adjust until other shocks 
occur. Given the same size of shock (at absolute value), the fraction of firms disposed to 
adjust after a positive shock is smaller than the fraction of firms disposed to adjust after a 
negative shock. As a result if the hazard adjustment function is asymmetric (it is less 
likely to adjust positive deviations than negative ones at firm level) lumpy upward 





Consider a firm i that employs    but would employ    (in logs) workers if 
frictions were momentarily removed. The difference between these quantities (but in 
different time periods) is called the gap or the distance of the current value from the 
target level: 
t i e ,
*
,t i e
                                                 
4 The (S,s) rule behaves as follows: an individual agent allows his state variable to fall freely until it 
reaches a certain critical level s; at this point abrupt action takes place and the state variable is reset to an 
upper value S from where the cycle starts again. 
 
5 See Rotemberg, Julio, 1989  
 
6 See Caballero, Engel, 1993   
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, , − − ≡ t i t i t i e e x
for any firm i at time t. 
 
The gap  is distributed across firms over time with a distribution function 
 which denote the cross-section distribution of gaps   before adjustment is made. 
Thus the fraction of firms with gap between   and 
t i x ,
) (x Ft t i x ,
dz z z +  is equal to  . To make 
things simple I work on discrete time and accordingly under a timing principle which can 
be defined as follows: each time period, t-1, ends with a gap   with distribution
7 
; then different shocks occur as the next period, t, starts resulting in a gap   
with distribution   and finally  at the end of the period t and the beginning of the 
period t+1, firms adjust their employment level resulting in a gap with distribution 
. 
) (x dFt






t i x ,
) (x Ft
  
  Further I assume that firms put this gap equal to zero any time they adjust. This 
process happens with a given probability which is called adjustment hazard function and 
depends on the value of the gap. The adjustment hazard function could take different 
forms but I better consider it as an increasing function of its state variable. Therefore I 
first need to construct a measure of the gap (state variable) in order to compute the 
adjustment hazard function.  
 
I try to construct a measure of gap starting from the overall assertion on a lumpy 
and infrequent adjustment of employment in firm level. The optimal level of employees 
the firm should employ is determined by the way the aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks 
affect the deviation of the actual level from what is called the optimal level and of the 
previous value of this deviation as well. Following this chain of key employment 
determinants and considering a large number of firms, I can study the macroeconomic of 
                                                 
7 The index at F(.) function holds for defining the distribution of shocks after the firms have adjusted their 
actual employment level to the desired one. 
  7employment adjustment. But I start constructing first an employment picture that 
characterizes the aggregate behavior dynamics and by the end of the paper I try to 




Aggregate Employment Dynamics 
 
If I assume that employment shares are independent of gap distribution across 
firms, the average employment growth rate is equal to the growth rate of the aggregate 
employment. Therefore, the average aggregate employment change (equal to the 
expected gap, expectation taken over the gaps in all firms) in discrete time could be given 
as the sum of all employment deviations weighted by the their density after adjustment is 
made.  
 
In the survival analysis, the hazard function is the rate at which a spell can be 
completed at a time t if it hasn’t been changed up to that moment. In my case, the 
adjustment hazard function is the instantaneous rate at which a firm adjusts its 
employment level conditional on not having done this up to the moment that the gap was 
smaller than x. But differently from the traditional hazard function, this function depends 
indirectly on time through the variable x.  
 
Then, the average aggregate employment change could be given as: 
 
(2)                      ) ( ) ( x dF x x A t
x
t t ∫ Λ = ∆
 
where    denotes the aggregate employment change,  )  is the cross sectional 
distribution of firms with deviation x at time t and before shocks are experienced, and 
 is the hazard function or the probability that each firm adjust its employment 
shortage x at a given period of time t. Thus the average employment change by firms 
with shortage x at time t is equal to 
t A ∆ x Ft(
) (x t Λ
) (x x t Λ .  
  8 
The hazard adjustment function could take several forms conditional on the shape 
of adjustment cost. The increasing hazard means that the probability that a firms adjust its 
employment level is increasing with the gap value and this feature is consistent with the 
non-convex theory of adjustment cost where firms follow an infrequent adjustment 
process. The decreasing hazard function behaves in the opposite way, in the meaning that 
smaller is the deviation of the employment level from the desirable one less likely it is 
that the firms adjust its employment level. This function stands for convex adjustment 
cost theory. The intermediate case is the constant hazard which is independent of gap 
value.  
 
The name “hazard” motivates this paper which considers the hazard adjustment 
function as a one of the known hazard forms, Cox proportional. Starting from the above 
definition, I parameterize the hazard function as a Cox proportional hazard model written 
as: 
 
(3 ) exp( 1 ) ( x x t β − − = Λ   
 
where  β  is a parameter which takes only positive values in order to allow the 
hazard function is increasing in x.   
 
Caballero and Engel (1993) express the hazard function as a piece-wise linear 
function of the gap and also as a quadratic one. Their hazard  representations   x x t β = ) (  Λ
or   are only special cases of Cox proportional hazard functions. They are  
however confirmed for tiny values of the −βx. This restriction could be interpreted in the 
way that only for small values of weighted gap deviations, higher moments of the cross-
sectional density of gaps affect the evolution of aggregate employment through mean-
variance and variance-skewness interaction terms in a nonlinear style.  
2 ) ( x x t β = Λ
 
In contrast to Caballero and Engel I shall base the analysis on the exponential 
representation of hazard function and replacing it at the aggregate expression I’ll get: 
  9 
(4)  ∆At =    [] ∫ − −
x
t x dF x x ) ( ) exp( 1 β
 
The variable x denotes the above-mentioned deviations across firms and over time. The 
expression (6) is equivalent to: 
 
 
(5)        [] )) exp( 1 ( it it t t x x E A β − = ∆  
 
where E(.) is the expectation operator 
 
Caballero and Engel transform the aggregate employment equation in a regression 
of the aggregate employment change variable on the moments of the gap distribution 
. In order to test which of the hazard expressions (linear piece-wise, quadratic or 
exponential) fits better the aggregate adjustment behavior and in the absence of some 
adequate data I make use of simulated data whose simulation method will be explained in 
Section III.  
) (x Ft
 
Below I consider two cases when gap distribution is known or unknown to the researcher. 
 
 
A. Unknown Gap Distribution Case 
 
If one does not have information on the distribution of the gap (if it is a normal or 
exponential) before adjustment is made but observes xit for i = 1, 2, … N and t = 1, 2, …, 
T, a useful approximation of the expected value expression could be through the 
empirical mean representation: 
  
(6)     ∑ − − ≅ ∆
N
i
it it t x x
N
A )) exp( 1 (
1
β  
  10This approximation is good only if N is large. I make use of the simulated values
8 
of employment and gap across firms and time periods and under a large number N of 
firms, I could estimate the parameter β by minimizing :  
 


















Using the Gauss-Newton method I could obtain estimates by iterations. For a 
large number of observations also the asymptotic normal distributed behavior of errors is 
guaranteed
9. The convergence is obtained after a small number of iterations. The 
following tables
10 contain some evidence on the statistics of the parameter and the 
goodness of fit.  
 
Using simulated data I check how Cox proportional, linear and quadratic hazard 
functions perform differently. After estimating the mean nonlinear regression relating the 
gap with the aggregate employment fluctuations I regress the average employment 
change on the mean and variance of the gap before adjustment is made. I observe that in 
the case the adjustment is huge (there is a wide range of full adjustment generated), the 
nonlinear approximation through the exponential Cox proportional form fits much better 
the real values of average employment fluctuations than the linear regression of the 
aggregate employment fluctuation on the mean and variance of gap before adjustment is 
made. But when the adjustment is insignificant (the adjustment range is very small), the 
latter estimation affords a goodness of fit much better than the previous one.  The Durbin-
Watson test supports the lack of first order correlation in residuals in both cases when 
they are prevailing. I show below  a table with simulated results of the estimated 
parameters of the three regressions, their goodness of fit, Durbin –Watson results on the 
serial correlation of their residuals.     
 
                                                 
8 At the end of this chapter I will describe largely how the data used in these estimations methods are 
generated. 
9 See W. Greene “Econometric Analysis”, Chapter 9 for a proof of the asymptotic normal behavior of error 
under a large number of observations.  
 
10 See Table 1 and 2 at the next pages. 
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Table 2 
Aggregate Regressions Results (no adjustment case) 





) exp( 1 ) ( x x t β − − = Λ
(My function) 
Mean linear 
x x t β = Λ ) (  
(CE 1
st function) 
Mean variance linear 
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(0.0045) 
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  14B. A Theoretical Example Considering Gap as Normal Variable  
 
 
If one does know that the gap follows from a well-known density (lets say a 
normal or gamma distribution) before adjustment is made, then the integral representing 
the aggregate employment change could be resolved directly. 
  
  Lemma 1
11 
 




(8)  [] )
2
exp( ) ( ) exp( 1 (
2 2
2 s
m s m m x x x E it it it
β
β β β + − − − = − −  
 
It follows that the aggregate employment integral will take the form as in equation (2), 
which means that I have a nonlinear regression function that looks like: 
 
(9)          [ ] ) exp( ) (
2
it x E s m m A β β − − − = ∆  
 
where  [ ) exp( it x E ] β −     represents the mean probability of no adjustment  
and  [ ) exp( 1 it x E ] β − −   represents the mean probability of adjustment   
 
Considering the expression (9), if xit represents the gap and ∆A represents the 
aggregate employment fluctuation then the relationship (9) means that an increase in the 
expected value of the probability of non adjusting will decrease the aggregate 
employment change. On the other hand, the expected value of non-adjustment probability 




                                                 
11 See Appendix 1 for a proof of Lemma 1 
  15Now lets consider the situation when two different (in size) shocks occur. Due to 
the first shock, the gap variable is distributed normally with mean zero and a given 
variance s
2 and due to the second shock the gap is distributed normally with mean m and 
the same variance s
2 as in the first case. The difference between the first aggregate 
employment change and the second aggregate employment change (∆A(0) and ∆A(1)) 
represents the aggregate employment reaction to the shock size. This difference is given 
below as: 
 
(10)     [] [ ]
2 2 ) 0 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 0 ( ) 1 ( s E s m E A A β φ β φ + − = ∆ − ∆  
 
where  [ ) 1 ( ] φ E  and  [ ] ) 0 ( φ E  are the mean probability of adjustment in each case   
  
Under the condition of a positive β and if (m−βs
2) is positive, the above difference 
is certainly positive. Otherwise it could be even zero which means no adjustment is made. 
The same story could be said for a negative shock. This implies that size doesn’t matter  
for the aggregate employment change. What really matters is the distribution of shock 
determined by its moments.  
 
 
C. Exponential Bound for the Aggregate Employment Change 
 
In order to know something more on the properties of the aggregate employment 





Let x be an independent random variable. Suppose 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and let β be a real 
number. Then 
 
(11)  [][ ] [ ] ) ( ) exp( 1 )) exp( 1 ( ) ( 1 ) exp(
2 2 x E x x E x E β β β − − ≥ − − ≥ −  
 
                                                 
12 See Appendix 2 for a proof of Lemma 2 
  16If I denote with x (as I have done so far) the value of the gap to be adjusted by the 
firm then the above inequation implies that the smallest value the expected value 
[ )) exp( 1 ( x x E ] β − −  could take is zero, but this could happen only in case the mean of x 
(gap) is zero which is a value to be economically excluded.  
 
In this way I could show that even for small values of x, the aggregate change in 
employment is non smaller than a certain value determined by the variance and the mean 
of the gap distribution suggesting that there is adjustment even for small values of x but it 
could be inconsiderable. So even for small deviations of the current employment value 
from the target there is a tiny adjustment process taking place. 
 
But this result contradicts the overall theory and evidence of no adjustment for the 
small values of gap or the inaction range of adjustment. Therefore either I should 
abandon the exponential hazard model or I should deny the inaction range of adjustment 
process. It seems as this mathematical logics could not advocate the use of exponential 
Cox proportional hazard function and for the gap value smaller than one this complies 
with the empirical results as well. 
 
The inaction range is symmetric around zero because the parameters of the 
adjustment hazard function were taken as equal either for positive gap or for negative 
one. If the asymmetric aspect will be considered by permitting the adjustment hazard 
coefficient to be different this could introduce skewness in the adjustment aggregate 
distribution by changing the inaction range.    
 
 
D. Data Generating Process 
 
In this part I will describe how the data used in the three estimation methods given 
above are generated. I start this process generating three different shock variables 
(productivity, wage and demand) as a random walk. Then, based on the first order 
conditions
13 of the production function, and some fixed parameters, I make use of shocks 
                                                 
13 See the next chapter for the right expression of the fist order conditions.  
  17variables to construct the path of employment desired level. Assuming further that the 
adjustment process of employment is lumpy and infrequent at firm level, I derive the path 
of actual employment according to a lumpy order considering a given threshold such that 
if the deviation of the desired value of employment from the actual one is bigger than the 
given threshold I say the employment adjusts fully and set the actual value equal to the 
desired value. Otherwise I set it equal to the previous employment value.  
 
After having derived the paths of desired and actual employment, I take their 
difference and call it the gap variable   as in the expression (1). To derive the variable 
(which denotes the aggregate employment change), I take the average of all 
generated gaps across firms either for positive or negative gap values and use them 




These generated data will be used to assess different estimation procedures.   
Therefore the final step is to regress in three different ways (using a Cox proportional, 
linear and quadratic hazard function) the constructed variable  t A ∆  on the gap variable 
. To distinguish between the three regression methods, I compare their respective 
goodness of fit and the residuals. It is obvious to opt for the regression that enjoys the 






Simulated Firm Model & Gap estimation 
 
CE
14 model a sector with non-convex adjustment costs where the average 
employment change is an increasing function of the deviation of the desired employment 
value from the actual one. The desired level of employment is the number of employees 
the firm would keep in if adjustment costs were temporarily off and is equal to the 
frictionless level the firm would hold if it never faces adjustment cost plus a firm specific 
                                                 
14 Caballero and Engel (1993, 1997) 
  18constant. They assume further that the deviation between the desired from the actual 
value of employment is likely to be stationary over time. 
 
Accordingly, I model a sector with a large but fixed number of oligopolistic 
competitive firms where each firm faces isoelastic demand for its product under a Cobb-
Douglas technology with constant returns in its factor demands, labor and hours. Both 
demand and technology are affected by shocks which follow a joint geometric random 
walk. Firms face a wage curve that increases in the average number of hours worked as:  
 
(12)    ) ( it t it h g w w + =
where   denotes the wage shock and g(.) is a nonlinear function of hours  t w
 
Also firms always choose the same number of hours
15 worked per worker in the 
absence of the employment adjustment costs and adjust to the shocks only by varying 
employment. The firm production function
16 and demand at a given instant of time t are 
given by 
 
(13)  a h e y + + = ) ( β α  
(14)  v y p + − = ) 1 ( η  
 
where y, e, h, p, a and v denote output, employment, hours per worker, price and 
productivity and demand shock, respectively while α  and β denote the 
employment and hours share respectively 
 
Under these assumptions, firms maximize the current revenues with respect to 
employment  (facing no adjustment costs) given that h (hours) is at its frictionless optimal 
level. The first order condition of this maximization problem with respect to employment 
results in an expression of difference target employment levels in terms of productivity, 
wage and demand shocks as follows: 
                                                 
15 See Sargent (1978), Shapiro (1986) and Bils (1987) for a formalization of this idea 
16 For simplicity I exclude the capital form the production function. 





∆ − ∆ + ∆
= ∆
1
* w v a
e    where    0 1 ≠ −αγ  
 
As I mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, the path of actual and desired 
employment values will be derived based on the expression (15). To obtain an expression 
for the hours I assume further there are no adjustment costs in average hours and the first 
order condition of firm maximization problem with respect to hours will yield: 
 
(16)  










=  and  
1
µ βγ −  ≠ 0 
 
and (µ-1) is the elasticity of marginal wage schedule with respect to average hours 
worked.  
 
This implies that firms first fix the employment at its optimal level and then 
determines the level of hours to be performed as a function of employment. Given the 
path of changes in hours, the path of changes in wages could be derived as: 
 
(17)   it t it h w w ∆ + ∆ = ∆ µ  
 
Both first order conditions yield an expression that links the change of 
employment with the change in hours and shock variables and also a relationship 
regarding the gap construction: 
 
(18)   it i it it e h h x ∆ + − = ) ( θ  
 
(19)     it it it e h e
* ∆ + ∆ − = ∆ θ
 
  20where  represents the sum of all the shocks primitively considered in this 
model. The expression (18) implies that the estimation of the parameter θ would help to 





One recognize that the equation (19) resembles to a standard regression form if 
some replacements are made as : 
 
(20)   it it i it h const e ε θ + ∆ − = ∆  
 
where   it ε corresponds to the overall shock after removing the (constant) individual effect 








 is increasing in the elasticity of marginal wage schedule 
with respect to average hours (µ-1). 
 
The economic intuition behind the expression (19) suggests that when a firm faces 
two possibility of adjustment, it will prefer the less costly one. Hence, for a given value 
of shock, the higher the marginal cost of changing hours, the higher is the management of 
adjustment by changing employment than by changing hours. Then, if one possesses data 
on employment and hours change of a large set of firms and regresses the employment 
change variable on hours change variable, an estimated value of the parameter θ  is 
obtained. 
 
But this model suffers from the endogeneity problem because hours are used to 
hold part of the shock, at least in short run, when employment doesn’t adjust fully as such 
is the case. This brings about a correlation between the change in hours and the error 
term. Therefore a simple OLS estimation of θ  could yield biased estimates.  
 
If I do not possess data on hours per worker per plant, I can substitute this variable 
by the wage variable and instead of the regression (19) I’ll get: 
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This regression seems more attractive because it contains a smaller shock term 
compared to the shock term of the expression (19) as displayed below: 
 
(22)   it it
t e e







and by making the same replacement as above I’ll get: 
 











where the error term is smaller than in the previous case and therefore even the OLS 
estimation method could produce better estimates of the coefficient  µ
θ  in spite of the 
endogeneity problem the regression still suffers from (but it is of lesser importance). 
 
In the following part I’ll see estimation techniques either dealing with the wage 
employment fluctuation regression or with the hour employment fluctuation regression.  
 
 
IV Estimation  
 
Differently from Caballero and Engel, I take into consideration the fact that 
another way to estimate the parameter “theta” in the regression (19) is through an 
instrumental variable, which should be highly correlated in time with the endogenous 
variable (change in hours) and not correlated at all with the “error term”. Hence, I will 
consider two situations when the gap variable is constructed based on an one-threshold 
model and on a two-threshold model.  
 
Assume there exists such a variable. Applying the law of iterated expectation, the 
lag value of this variable will not be correlated with the error term if this error term has a 
mean zero (the error represents the shock variable that by assumption follows a random 
  22walk). Under the same motivation, if the expected value of the change in hours is 
sufficiently different from zero, the lag value of IV variable would be correlated with it. 
According to the same statistical law, the higher the variability displayed by hours the 
bigger the correlation of the one-lag change in wage with the change in hours, the better 
IV estimation. Also the assumption made about the behavior of shocks as random walk 
guarantees the mean very close to zero of the error term.  
 
Below I try to check the validity of this IV estimator and compare it with the OLS 
estimator as well. In the case of 2-option adjustment model (with only 1 threshold), the 
variable hours displays too little variability and therefore the expected value of change in 
hours is around zero. This would invalidate the use of one lag wage change as 
instrumental variable. For all values of shocks’ variances, the OLS estimation provides 
bad estimates of theta. An increase (in digit) in the variance of shocks (demand, 
productivity and wage) will provide even worse theta estimates and higher full 
adjustment probability. This could be explained by the fact that both variables (hours and 
employment) display little variability in this model. When the variances are very small 
there is a high range of zero adjustment probability. Small variances of shocks lead to 
small values of employment (many of them less than the threshold) which is translated as 
non-adjustment. When the variance increases, the full adjustment range increases also 
(there are values of employment bigger than the threshold). Even the increase of one of 
the shocks’ variances could be sufficient to increase the range of full adjustment.  
 
Thus, I could say that for any variance of shocks, using one-lag change in wages 
as an instrumental variable gives a bad estimate of theta. IV estimation doesn’t resolve 
the problem because of the low correlation of the instrumental variable with the 
endogenous one. The change of threshold value affects only the values of adjustment 
probabilities and the OLS and IV estimators still remain invalid.  
 
When another order (with more than one threshold) is employed to describe the 
employment adjustment process, for any variance of shocks, OLS estimation offers better 
estimators than IV estimation. OLS estimator is valid because the variables display high 
variability in this model. IV estimator is valid because of the strong correlation between 
  23the IV variable and hours change variable. But independently of the validity of the 
estimators, IV estimation is not better than OLS estimation.  
 
Thus, the results of the above models show that IV estimation via one lag wage 
change provides a poor estimation. The data are simulated taking into consideration 1000 
observations and 1500 replications. The further increase of number of observations and 
replications does not affect the results.  
 
To finish, I consider the expression (22) and regress the employment fluctuations 
on the wage fluctuations to estimate the coefficient  µ
θ .  Either in the full adjustment 
case or in the little adjustment case I obtain better estimates of the coefficient than 
through the other regressions and methods.  
  
Below I display the OLS and IV theta estimators’ statistics in each cases and some graphs 
of the deviation of the estimated coefficients from their real value for each adjustment 
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One option case 
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Figure 3 
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Figure 5 
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Table 4 
Two option case 
(real θ  = -5, real  µ
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In this paper I have analyzed the aggregate behavior of employment adjustment 
using simulated data according to a lumpy adjustment model at the firm level. Using the 
CE model I found that an Cox exponential hazard function dependant on the deviation of 
the desired level from the  actual one would explain better the aggregate employment 
change than the CE quadratic hazard function in case that data simulation process 
complies with  full adjustment process. But in case that data simulation process is in line 
with few adjustment process, CE quadratic hazard function performs much better. Also 
the simulated data has shown that the regression of the employment change on the wage 
change could give better estimates and measures of the deviations of the desired value of 
the employment from the actual one. 
  
In sum, this paper suggests that would be better to measure the gap considering 
the relationship between the wage change and employment. Also it would suggest to use 
some exponential modeling of the hazard function in case that data exhibit full 
adjustment behavior and a quadratic modeling in the opposite case. Anyway this paper 
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Appendix 1  
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I can write  , where U is standard normally distributed. For any real number b 
have that 
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The last integrand is a normal density so the integral is therefore equal to 1. Hence 
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Furthermore, I get from (3) and (4), by differentiating ϕ(β) that  
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which by convexity could be expressed as: 
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For positive values of x the expression (9) could be transformed in: 
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Likewise for negative x I’ll have: 
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If –1 ≤ x ≤ 0 then 
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